Brad Miller (D-NC) asks the complement to the question I asked last night: Where’s the guy who doesn’t know shit about Wall Street to assess these bailouts?

Brad Miller asks, doesn’t Edward Liddy’s past board membership on Goldman Sachs create the appearance of conflict of interest–not to mention someone without the sufficient distance to approach this problem fairly?

Geithner doesn’t seem too troubled about any potential conflict of interest.

The WSJ makes clear that Treasury specifically avoided discussing bonuses when negotiating new aid for AIG, at a time when they were forcing the UAW to renegotiate compensation.

Edward Liddy said that all the CDS traders were gone. But apparently, we just paid $6.4 million to one of them (though he did give the bonus back).

Yes, AIG has given employees a memo warning them to watch for their own safety. But the apparent purpose of that memo is to make sure they don’t talk to the press.

Here are a few more details why we’re right to be panicked about stories that AIG’s reinsurance side is a house of cards, too.

I’m with Jane. Tim Geithner is shortly going to have to admit he knew a lot more about AIG bonuses a lot earlier than he has admitted. And frankly, I’m more interested in what he learned in September than what he has learned in the last month.

For earlier liveblog posts:Committee Members Blowhard Statements Panel 1: The RegulatorsPanel 2: Liddy, Part One

While I agree that AIGFP’s employees should not be getting threats, I also think taxpayers should not tolerate the threats that AIG is making about our financial system.

The hearing can be view on the committee stream or CSPAN3.

The witnesses are:

Panel two Mr. Edward M. Liddy, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, American International Group Mr. Rodney Clark, Managing Director, Insurance Ratings, Standard & Poor’s

Edward Liddy’s op-ed in the WaPo reveals two significant details: those contracts were negotiated at least as early as March 17, 2008, just in time for AIG’s public confession that AIGFP was FUBAR. And the real issue here is not the contractual obligation to the banksters, but the risk still present in the CDS strategies.