First, we have the logs already listed, the 100-some page one started (probably) in early April, and the 59-page one in August.

Also, we’ve got descriptions of what these are and aren’t, and they are not described as what you say they are–and definitely not summaries, which by agreement have been left from this document dump.

So the evidence really says they are what they say they are.

Here is an example of what such a log might look like, from the Al Qahtani interrogation log (as published by Time):

26 November 2002
0400: SGT R wakes detainee- MPs take detainee to bathroom- he is searched and cuffed
to chair. Detainee takes a couple sips of water. SGT A advises detainee that a
bottle of water is much easier than a bag.
0405: SGT A begins by quoting a verse from Qoran. Detainee is awake, but completely
unresponsive.
0425: SGT A uses “ Manchester Document” theme, explains to detainee how he uses
interrogation resistance techniques. Detainee is unresponsive; he has yet to speak
a word. SGT R makes detainee stand up to avoid sleeping.
0430: SGT R states that because he (SGT R) is such a kind-hearted guy, he’ll let
detainee sit down, but detainee will stand again if he falls asleep.
0440: SGT R makes detainee stand again to avoid sleep.
0445: SGT A explains how detainee is not mentally sick, he simply feels guilty.
0457: SGT R allows detainee to sit down.
0505: SGT A tells detainee that no one feels sorry for him; he has brought this on
himself. Detainee takes two sips of water. Corpsman checks vitals. Guards take
detainee on walk to wake him up. Detainee has not spoken a word.
0515: Detainee is returned to chair. SGT A gives Arabic greeting detainee returns it.
Detainee says he’s mentally sick. SGT A explains to everyone in room how
detainee is using Al-Qaida handbook. Corpsman rechecks vitals.
0545: Detainee is stood up for 2 minutes to avoid sleep.
0550: SGT R makes detainee stand up to avoid sleep for two minutes.
0555: SGT R makes detainee stand up to avoid sleep.

I am almost certain this is what happened. The log goes to CTC, where a psychologist and various analysts discuss. In AZ’s case, a summary is included for non-professionals in the WH or NSC who are micro-managing the case. Many eyes are on this case for a number of reasons: they want the (false) confession re Iraq, they want intel on Al Qaeda, and they want to see how the new outsourcing of interrogation of “high-value detainees” by JPRA contractors is proceeding.

FBI derides the “unprofessionalism” of the latter, because they are being pushed out. FBI is not engaging in purely “rapport-building” interrogation. The use of more and more aggressive physical techniques by JPRA also appears totally self-defeating to the “professionals” of FBI and some CIA, too. But someone high up is backing the new JPRA chain of interrogation command, and FBI and the dissident CIA interrogators must stand down. Soufan complains to his superiors, but the complaint doesn’t really go anywhere (reminiscent of Mike Gelles, who complained at Guantanamo, but besides Mora, the complaint stalled at higher levels).

What I DO remember when the Aug. 2004 terror alert was announced was how incredibly suspicious it was. In retrospect it seems even more suspicious given the timing of the Edmunds letter to Kean.

Most of the writing on the Jan 25th memo has centered on the role of the Geneva Conventions and how the Bush administration would dodge legal landmines. I would suggest that it went further and was used as a guide by Gonzales in the April/May, 2002 time frame once Zubaydah was having his SER tactics ramped up. I beieve that once we see this memo and compare it to the Yoo document from August, they will use the same language and rationales ( I refuse to call them legal analysis). When these two documents are then seen side-by-side, you will have a portion of the link between Cheney and the spoon feeding of the OLC by Addington. Even though Yoo had written extensively about the power of the executive, there was no one who could hold a candle to the extreme views on this subject like Addington.

My gut tells me that a 28-page cable contains actual reporting results, not just a wash list of what procedures are desired, or of justifications for using them. Seems like we should be able to pull one of the existing memos, perhaps one of Bybee’s docs, and look at how much info one of his memos contains for comparison. Both the Aug. 2002 and Oct. 2002 memos are about 50 pages in length, are dense with legalese, citations and footnotes, likely contain about 2X the amount of content per page that a cable might contain per page.

Do we have any declassified emails/cables/other communications containing the content from an interrogation for comparison?

rincewind (53) — If as Marcy thinks these are not just cables but email communications, then FIELD and HQTRS are potentially not single addressees but names of distribution lists.

For the geeks out there, I could see this looking like a PROFS communique forwarded to recipients on a Lotus Notes or Exchange mail system. (And as I pointed out earlier this week, how convenient that the OA did not fully migrate to Exchange until 2003. How equally convenient the missing emails documentation could only begin Jan. 1, 2003…)

Here’s another tidbit for your timeline, which may or may not be relevant. I’m speaking of the May 2002 SERE Psychology Conference, held at the SERE White Bluff facility near Fairchild AFB. This is the conference where Ogrisseg presented the findings of his study, and of which he was “reminded” when asked by Baumgartner for info on effects of SERE exploitation techniques. These conferences typically include “observers” from CIA, FBI and DEA. I can’t say there’s any connection, but something to keep in mind.