GM did learn much about management from the Japanese, but the most important part of those learnings — including kereitsu development of preferred vendor relationships where engineering and quality was best — went out the door with GM’s fanboi fanaticism for all things Jose Ignacio Lopez de Arriortua.

Lopez did irreparable damage not only to GM but to the rest of the Big Three, encouraging them to look to price over the short-term instead of quality over the long-term, and to do so in highly unethical fashion. I really wish Nate had supplied dates on his chart because if Lopez’ impact appears on the chart where I believe it might, it could explain why GM believed that they were doing the right thing in an environment where their marketshare was increasingly threatened.

Unfortunately, the situation playing out before our eyes is not going to improve the automaker-supplier relationship. With Fiat and Chrysler appearing on the verge of a shotgun wedding, some suppliers will automatically be on the verge of failure — those which Chrysler relied on heavily will be forced to take a backseat to Fiat’s suppliers, in some of which Fiat owns a stake. Ford is known across the industry as a less-than-ethical player, demanding “rebates” well after awarding contracts, just before or during delivery of material or equipment. Their current situation will only reinforce this behavior. And GM’s bankruptcy will likely force a number of other suppliers regardless of quality to wither and die, having operated for too long with too tight margins and carrying paper and risk for GM. Those that remain will not trust any of the Big Three and will continue to model their production around this lack of faith.

The other factor which doesn’t appear in Nate’s chart is the direct loss of margin attributable to shift in marketshare due to technology transfers. The foreign automakers used many of the same suppliers as the Big Three and benefited greatly from the sunk costs in engineering paid out by the Big Three; they leapfrogged to equal status and then with nominal additional costs improved on quality over the Big Three (I’m thinking specifically of the Koreans here). It’s happening now in China, and it’s happened in the Japanese-owned plants here in the U.S.

Somehow this Shock Doctrine fire sale approach to rebuilding the industry has got to stop and give American automakers the breathing room needed to do a real assessment of what works and what doesn’t — but I don’t know how that’s ever going to happen.

I am saying that long term relationships are becoming fragile or dispensable when they are needed the most, whether they are automotive company IT systems or product drivelines.

Public agencies nationwide in 2008 started to publish for the first time how much they will owe in retiree medical costs, which differ from city to city, based on population, number of retirees, and the generosity of medical packages. What governments are finding in many cases is that the cost estimates are far bigger than they expected.

And trust me, the Japanese lowball their contracts in other ways, largely by screwing suppliers. They’re definitely NOT paying more, and in a number of cases I’ve heard of, suppliers charge higher prices to the Big 2.5 to make up for the fact that the Japanese clients aren’t paying them.

My point is that there are times when the Japanese will stick with a Japanese supplier EVEN IF that supplier’s quality has declined and EVEN IF there’s someone who does it better from another country.