committee member [cm]: mr addington [ad] you are not an employee of the executive branch ?

ad: no sir i am not ..

cm: then are you sir an officer of the senate ??

ad: no sir i am not ..

cm: and you are not an officer or a member of the peoples house .. i would know it if you were ..

ad: no sir i am not ..

committee chairman: sargeant-at-arms!!! place this man under arrest for impersonating an officer of the government …

I am wondering about the tarantula-scorpion metaphor.

Bob in HI

What Deadeye lived for was the James Bond derring-do Operational types. Better than any amount of Viagra, Deadeye fantasized about all those “Bad Boys” kicking Al Qaeda ass. These are the things that gave him pleasure and helped drag his sorry butt out of the bunker every morning.

What relationship did Cheney have with Reagan’s CIA director, William Casey? You remember that Casey conveniently died just before having to testify on Iran-Contra, and had a reputation as a CIA ‘cowboy’.

Bob in HI

cheney and rumsfeld wanted to undermine the treaty so they invented a “team b” and tasked them with manufacturing threats the cia said in no uncertain terms did not exist

if you remember the movie “hunt for red october”, it was based on cheneys false claims of some submarine that was SO good, “even the cia didn’t know about it”

cheney had a history of manufacturing data long before we attacked Iraq and it is really disturbing we let him do it again

the real cia is doing their very best to prevent him from doing it to us with Iran

here’s an excellant article documenting those events

and mind you, that article was authored before we attacked Iraq

here’s a youtube which also documents these manaics behavior

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020206.html

http://www.law.duke.edu/public…..ry/chevuni

From the latter link:

Cheney is also significant for what the Court’s opinion did not discuss. While showing sensitivity to the separation of powers, nowhere does the Court address the bold constitutional theory of presidential autonomy developed in the government’s briefs. The government argued that if FACA were interpreted to encompass the de facto member doctrine and to justify discovery against the Vice President, the statute would then be unconstitutional. This was so because the Task Force was gathering information and developing policy under the express direction of the President, who was exercising his textual constitutional power to seek opinions from his cabinet and to prepare to recommend “such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.” These powers, plus his obligation to report on the State of the Union, provide “specific textual foundations for the President’s powers to gather information and develop policy . . . [and are] not subject to manipulation or interference by the Congress.” The government’s brief concluded that “[i]nterference with the President’s advice- and information-gathering activities is no less unconstitutional when it affects the exercise of his Recommendations or Opinion Clause authority than when it touches on his power to grant pardons, nominate judges, or to have legislation presented for his approval or veto.”

Had this breathtaking approach to Presidential power been adopted, it would have resulted in far stronger protection from disclosure of executive branch communications and deliberations than is provided by the doctrine of executive privilege. Approaching the issue in Cheney as an application of the principle of executive privilege set forth in Nixon would eventually produce a balancing analysis, weighing the interests served by disclosure against the burdens on Presidential confidentiality and autonomy. Greater need for the information (for example, when information is critical to a specific legislative decision) tips the balance in favor of disclosure; greater need for confidentiality of the information (for example, when national security is directly implicated) tips the balance in favor of non-disclosure.

The claim presented in the government’s Cheney briefs is that the processes of Presidential advice- and information-gathering are beyond Congress’ power to regulate. Activities of the executive branch beyond Congress’ power to regulate are also beyond Congress’ power of inquiry or investigation as well. See Barenblatt v. United States. No balancing of competing interests is appropriate because Congress lacks any authority to interfere or inquire.

Some interesting thoughts…

Sy Hersh’s new piece is out. Cheney has NOT been losing on the Iran front.

http://www.newyorker.com/repor…..table=true